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INTRODUCTION
As an emerging petroleum producer, Kenya has the opportunity to reap the benefits of its natural resource wealth to further economic and human development. Many of the key factors that will determine the amount of potential government revenue from Kenya's petroleum wealth fall outside of the government's control. The most important of these are the volume of commercially recoverable oil in the country and the price for that oil when it reaches international markets. The main factor within the governments' control is the set of fiscal (tax) terms offered to international oil companies to explore for new sources of oil and natural gas.
These fiscal terms are set out in a series of production sharing contracts that the government has signed with international oil companies. The fiscal terms establish the broad framework that determine how much of the divisible, or "after cost", revenue will be allocated to the company and how much will be allocated to the government. During the exploration phase, the interest of the companies and the government are broadly aligned -both sides are hoping that exploration success can be rapidly converted into large-scale petroleum production. Once production begins, however, tensions between the parties can arise as both sides seek to maximize their share of project revenues.
There is growing concern among resource-rich developing countries in Africa and beyond that companies are employing aggressive tax avoidance strategies in order to increase their share of divisible revenue. 1 There are a number of potential mechanisms through which companies seek to minimize their revenue payments to governments. One specific area of concern is the use of subsidiaries registered in tax havens.
Multinationals have increasingly organized their corporate structures around tax havens and low tax jurisdiction in order to take advantage of international loopholes.
2 Tax havens provide the attractive combination of zero or very low tax rates combined with high levels of secrecy. Creating "conduit" subsidiary companies in between the productive company overseas and the parent company at home allows companies to shift both profits and costs and in the process significantly reduce tax payments. While developing countries have complained about these practices for many years, following the recent economic crisis, developed countries have now recognized that they too are losing vast amounts of potential tax revenue. The problem is particularly acute in the extractive sector, where large multinational companies establish complex corporate structures in order to minimize tax payments and maximize profits. Research on the 10 largest extractive sector companies in the world demonstrates that they control over 6,000 subsidiaries of which more than a third were located in tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions. 4 Zambia provides a concrete example where billions of dollars in revenue were lost due to copper being sold on paper to a subsidiary of Glencore registered in the low-tax jurisdiction of Switzerland.
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The first step in analyzing the potential for government revenue loss due to tax havens is to understand the corporate structures of the companies that hold petroleum rights in Kenya. This paper therefore analyzes the initial allocation and subsequent transfer of rights to the 41 petroleum blocks currently licensed to international oil companies. Having identified the thirty-five companies that directly hold Kenyan petroleum rights, we then map their corporate structures through various subsidiaries through to the ultimate parent company.
Unfortunately, the Government of Kenya provides relatively little information on the ownership of petroleum rights. International best practice in extractive sector governance recommends disclosure of corporate structures and beneficial (ultimate) owners of extractive sector rights. However, the government of Kenya provides little more than an outdated map showing petroleum Blocks, along with an imprecise name of leading companies.
The data complied in this report has been drawn from company documents that are public domain information including annual reports, press releases, and, most importantly, corporate filings provided to investors as required by stock exchange authorities. We have also drawn on publicly accessible corporate registries, including the consolidation of corporate information provided by Open Corporates. 6 While there may be some minor gaps, where company information was incomplete or inconsistent, we believe that the data included in this report provides a comprehensive overview of the holders of petroleum rights in Kenya.
This analysis reveals the widespread use of tax havens and low tax jurisdictions in the corporate structures of companies holding petroleum rights in Kenya. In total, thirty-five separate companies hold a percentage stake in at least one of the 41 active petroleum license in Kenya. These subsidiaries are ultimately owned by twenty-seven separate parent companies. Seventeen of these parent companies own petroleum rights in Kenya directly through a subsidiary registered in a tax haven. Ultimately, all but five of the parent companies make use of a tax haven or low-tax jurisdiction as part of their wide corporate structure.
TAX HAVENS AND SECRECY JURISDICTIONS
There is no single agreed definition of what constitutes a tax haven. The first formal definition came from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the late 1990s 7 . Since that time definitions, and corresponding lists, have been generated by multiple organizations including the IMF, the European Union, the United State Government, as well as the Tax Justice Network.
The original OECD analysis was based on a four-part definition including: no or low effective tax rate; ring-fencing where preferential tax regimes are insulated from the domestic economy; lack of transparency involving inadequate regulatory supervision and financial disclosure; and lack of effective exchange of information. 8 The IMF adopts a similar three-part definition for offshore financial centres (OFCs) including: a primary orientation of business towards nonresidents; a favorable regulatory environment (low supervisory requirements and minimal information disclosure); and low or zero taxation schemes 9 .
More recently, emphasis has shifted more towards tax cooperation and secrecy as the defining feature of tax havens. The OECD now focuses exclusively on a declining number of what it calls "non-cooperative" jurisdictions 10 . For civil society, while a "zero or low tax rate" continues to be a defining feature, secrecy has become the more prominent focus. The Tax Justice Network, for example, considers the essence of tax havens to revolve around two inter-related kinds of secrecy: 11 1. strong bank secrecy: information can not be obtained from banks and other financial institutions for official purposes such as tax collection; Delaware is widely acknowledged as having the lowest level of corporate disclosure in the United States 13 . It is one of the reasons why the one million businesses incorporated there outnumber the population of the state. More specifically, company accounts and beneficial ownership details are not maintained in official records, and international regulatory requirements and requests for information sharing are frequently ignored. Delaware also offers tax exemptions including a zero tax on "intangible assets" including patents, copyrights, and brands. As a result of these provisions, US corporations commonly create a Delaware subsidiary between the parent company and overseas investments.
The Netherlands, home of the world's first corporation (the Dutch East India Company) remains a highly attractive location for multinationals to establish subsidiaries. Having concluded tax treaties with 91 countries, routing money through a subsidiary in the Netherlands allows companies to minimize withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties.
14 Multinational companies also commonly use subsidiaries in the Netherlands for shifting internal corporate debt. Known as "conduit" or "mailbox" companies, they are engaged in what is known as "treaty shopping" where a legal entity is created in a specific jurisdiction in order to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly. The Netherlands is home to more conduit companies than any other jurisdiction in the world. Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) are the key to the Netherlands' attractiveness as a home for conduit companies. In theory, DTAs were originally designed to avoid companies operating in multiple countries and paying tax on the same income in two jurisdictions. In practice, they are increasingly being used to avoid paying tax altogether. Mongolia has recently terminated a DTA with the Netherlands over concern about revenue loss from their mining sector (See Textbox 1).
15 The Netherlands has also been implicated in a recent study on the mining sector revenue loss in Malawi. 16 In July 2015, Kenya signed a Double Taxation Agreement with the Netherlands, providing for zero or reduced rates on withholding taxes on dividends and interest. The focus of the analysis was a company called Turquoise Hill Resources, which developed the Oyu Tongoi mine, the country's largest project. Although the company is Canadian, it used a subsidiary in the Netherlands (Oyu Tolgoi Netherlands BV) in order to benefit from the double tax treaty. While Turquoise Hill was the most important of the companies, it was not alone. According to the Mongolian authorities, almost 70% of all foreign direct investment was coming through the Netherlands as a tax shield.
In November 2012, the Mongolian Parliament passed a law to terminate the double taxation treaties with the Netherlands effective 1 January 2014. They also terminated similar agreements with Luxembourg, Kuwait and the UAE. Ultimately, however, ending the agreement with the Netherlands will not impact Turquoise Hill or the Oyu Tongoi mine. A stabilization clause in the contract guarantees that the exemption from the Mongolian withholding tax will continue to exist for the life of the mine.
THE ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM RIGHTS
Kenya allocates rights to explore and produce petroleum through the negotiation of a production sharing contract or PSC. The four potential oil-producing basins have been divided into 46 blocks or concessions.
Petroleum rights have been allocated based on unsolicited applications received from companies. Specifically, the Ministry of Energy and National Oil Corporation of Kenya accept applications from international oil exploration investors for available Blocks. The current process is set out in Figure 1 below (Note that the). 18 The petroleum policy of 2013 indicated that future licenses would be allocated according to a competitive bidding process often known as a "licensing round." The competitive process is increasingly seen as part of petroleum sector best practice. It is common for countries to move from an individual application system to a competitive process once commercial quantities of oil have been discovered. Rights can either be granted to a single company or to a consortium of companies. Where more than one company holds rights to a petroleum concession, the lead company is known as the "operator" while the other companies are known as "joint venture" partners. The operator serves as the overall manager and decision-maker of the project. Generally, though not always, the operator has the largest financial stake in the project. The operator is responsible for paying for the operation and recoups a portion of the expenses from joint venture partners, normally in proportion to their percentage stake in the project.
It is also common for a national oil company to hold an equity stake in the project, though this often happens only after exploration efforts have been successful. In Kenya, the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) has the right to a percentage stake in all projects. The size of the stake is negotiable and is set out in the PSC. NOCK does not participate during the exploration phase with all risks falling on the contractor. If exploration efforts are successful, NOCK has the right to acquire or "back-in" to the percentage stake as set out in the PSC. This is reportedly the case for Blocks 10BB and 13T. The one exception to the approach described above is Block 14T where NOCK holds the exclusive rights and is therefore solely responsible for exploration efforts in that area.
The Table below provides a comprehensive list based on public domain sources of the active production sharing contracts, including the lead signatory and the effective date.
THE TRANSFER OF PETROLEUM RIGHTS
The initial allocation of petroleum rights often bears little relation to the companies that subsequently hold those rights. In some case, the original rights holders agree to sell to other companies. The transfer then takes place following the approval of the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). This happened, for example, in the case of the two most significant petroleum Blocks in the country -10BB and 13T.
In 20 In other cases, the company holding the rights sells off a percentage stake to other joint venture partners. This process, known in the industry as a "farmdown," is often used to bring in additional technical and financial resources in order to meet minimum exploration commitments set out in the PSC. Once again, the process can be seen in the transfer of rights to Blocks 10BB and 13T.
In February 2011, Africa Oil Corporation sold a 50% stake of their rights to five Kenyan Blocks including 10BB and 13T to Tullow Oil Plc, an Irish company registered in the UK. Following the approval of the MEP, the 50% stake in the respective Blocks was transferred to a Tullow subsidiary named Tullow Kenya B.V. registered in the Netherlands. 21 In January 2016, Africa Oil Corp sold a further 25% stake in three Blocks (including 10BB and 13T) to a Danish company registered in the United Kingdom called Maersk Oil & Gas A/S. Following the approval of the MEP, the rights were transferred to three separate Maersk subsidiaries also registered in the UK. 22 Companies can also leave joint ventures, particularly after unsuccessful exploratory drilling. If one company leaves behind other joint venture partners, the stakes are normally reallocated proportionately to those that remain. An example can be seen in Block L-10B.
In May 2011, BG Kenya L-10B Limited (a wholly owned Kenyan subsidiary of BG Group Plc registered in the United Kingdom) signed a PSC as operator for offshore Block L-10B. From the outset, three other companies participated in the joint venture including Premier Oil Investments (25%), Cove Energy (15%) and Pancontinental Oil & Gas (15%). In April 2015, the last remaining joint venture partner Pancontinental Oil and Gas withdrew resulting in BG Kenya L-10B holding the full 100% stake. 23 A Block has been "relinquished" when all joint venture partners withdraw. This may happen as a result of unsuccessful exploration or when the exploratory period, as set out in the PSC, expires. Block L-08 offshore provides an example.
In 2006, Origin Kenya Pty Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of Australianregistered Origin Energy Limited) signed a PSC for offshore Block L-08. Later that year they sold a 25% stake in the Block to Pancontinental Oil & Gas. In June 2011, Pancontinental sold a 10% stake to Tullow Kenya B.V. That same month, Origin Kenya Pty Limited sold a 50% stake, and the role of operator, to a subsidiary of US-registered Apache Corp.
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In 2014, following the discovery of non-commercial volumes of natural gas, Apache withdrew from the Block. Pancontinental engaged in followon discussions with the MEP but with no company willing to take over the role of operator, the Block was ultimately relinquished 25 .
Once a Block has been relinquished, it is available for reallocation with the signing of a new PSC.
CURRENT STATUS OF KENYAN PETROLEUM RIGHTS
Kenya has demarcated a total of 46 petroleum blocks with 41 currently licensed to oil exploration and production companies.
The principal source of information provided by the government is a map of exploration blocks along with a list of the lead company. The most recent Block map provided by NOCK, from December 2014, is shown in Figure 2 .
Unfortunately, the map itself is outdated and the information provided is incomplete. Some blocks have been relinquished since this map was published (e.g. 10A, L-08, L-15 and L-26). Furthermore, the list of companies includes neither the legal names of the operators or joint venture partners nor information on the size of their respective stakes.
No additional information on the ownership of petroleum appears to be available from either the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum or the National Oil Corporation of Kenya. This is unfortunate as it is now widely accepted that good governance of extractive sector resources requires transparency on the ownership of rights (See Textbox 2).
Figure 2: Kenya Exploration Blocks -December 2014
Although the Kenyan Government provides only limited information on companies holding petroleum rights, most of the companies themselves provide substantial details. This is particularly true for publicly listed companies who are required by stock exchange regulations to report details of the ownership rights of petroleum blocks to their investors.
The Table below has been complied through an exhaustive review of public domain information including corporate filings to all relevant stock exchanges as well as company annual reports and press releases. We believe that this information is up-to-date as of January 2016. However, given the combination of low oil prices and exploration periods for several blocks nearing expiry, there could be some recent changes that have not been included. In particular, several
Textbox 2: Transparency on Ownership of Petroleum Rights
As part of the larger movement for greater transparency in the extractive sector, there is now increased attention focused on the companies that holding rights to oil, gas and mineral concessions. Norway once again sets the "gold standard" for oil sector transparency. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate publishes "FACTPAGES" providing detailed information on current and past rights holders including the legal names of operators and joint venture partners, and dates when the rights were acquired, sold and relinquished.
A number of other countries provide a public registry of oil companies active in exploration and production including: Argentina (Owners and Operators of Areas), Australia (National Offshore Petroleum Titles Administrator), Brazil (National Agency of Petroleum), Colombia (National Hydrocarbon Agency),Ghana (Ghana National Petroleum Corporation), India (Director General of Hydrocarbons), and Peru (Perupetro).
Several countries have expanded public data portals originally developed for the mining sector to include petroleum concessions (See Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique). Although these provide less information that the public registries, they do allow for public access to up-to-date information on operator and joint venture partners and, in some cases, license start and expiry dates. As Kenya has adopted an online cadastre for the mining sector, this could easily be expanded to include the petroleum sector as well.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has also extended its focus beyond transparency of revenue payments to ownership of extractive sector rights. The current EITI Standard, agreed in 2013 includes an obligation to maintain a "register of licenses" conferring rights to explore or exploit oil, gas and mineral resources. Disclosure must include the names of the license holders, the coordinates of the license area and the date of award and duration of the license. Disclosure on beneficial ownership (the natural person who directly or indirectly ultimately owns or controls the corporate entity) is recommended.
blocks appear to be close to relinquishment and may only be awaiting final government approval. 
CORPORATE STRUCTURES AND TAX HAVENS
As the data above shows, as of January 2016, public domain information indicates that there are thirty-five separate companies (either operators or joint venture partners) that hold a stake in at least one of the active petroleum Blocks in Kenya.
We have reviewed the current corporate structures of each of these companies in order to identify both the ultimate parent company as well as any intervening subsidiaries. The full data is shown in Annex II.
In several cases, multiple rights holding subsidiaries are owned by a single parent company. In total then, there are twenty-seven parent companies that hold petroleum rights in Kenya.
Seventeen parent companies use a subsidiary in a tax haven as part of the ownership chain leading directly to petroleum rights in Kenya. Below is a list of the parent company as well as the specific tax haven used in their corporate structure. 99 This tax minimization technique, selfdescribed by Ophir as a "cash box" arrangement, is one way in which companies structure their affairs in order to minimize tax payments.
Company Name Tax Haven
Below we list additional tax havens, not mentioned above, that are used within the wider corporate family of parent companies that hold petroleum rights in Kenya. The overwhelming majority of the companies that hold rights to petroleum blocks in Kenya have at least one subsidiary listed in a tax haven or low tax jurisdiction. In fact, only five companies listed below appear not to make use of tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions as part of their corporate structures.
Company
The data on corporate ownership set out above is drawn directly from company reports, stock exchange filings for investors and government corporate registries.
There are however some gaps in public domain information on ownership of petroleum rights. While publicly listed companies are required by stock exchanges to report details of their ownership rights, some companies have large and diverse portfolios and provide only limited information on specific ventures. Anardarko Petroleum Corp and Compañía Española de Petróleos, S.A.U., for example, disclose limited information on their corporate ownership of petroleum rights in Kenya. Both companies acknowledge that they have subsidiaries holding Kenyan petroleum rights (Andarko Kenya Company & CEPSA Kenya Ltd), but they provide no detail on how these specific subsidiaries fit into their wider corporate structures. There are also some gaps related to smaller, non-listed companies such as SwissOil Holdings International Ltd that lack either websites or public annual reports. 
TAX HAVEN CASE STUDIES

CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has demonstrated the widespread use of tax havens and low tax jurisdictions in the corporate structures of companies holding petroleum rights in Kenya. The thirty-five separate companies that hold a stake in an active petroleum license in Kenya are ultimately owned by twenty-seven parent companies. Seventeen parent companies own petroleum rights in Kenya directly through a subsidiary in a tax haven or low tax jurisdiction. Ultimately, all but five of the parent companies make use of a tax haven or low-tax jurisdiction as part of their wide corporate structure.
Oil companies commonly use subsidiaries in tax havens in order to minimize tax payments in both the countries in which they operate and the jurisdictions where they are headquartered. As Kenya is not yet a petroleum producing country, the risk to government revenues from the widespread use of subsidiaries in tax havens lies in the future rather than the present. Nevertheless, the government should to be alert to these risks as companies are incurring significant exploration expenses that will be recoverable if and when oil production begins. Care should be taken to review existing Double Taxation Agreements in order to ensure that benefits are not flowing to conduit companies that are not among the intended beneficiaries. Multinational oil companies should be required to publish financial results for each country where they have a presence (so-called country-by-country reporting). Kenyan subsidiaries should be required to publish their annual financial statements. This will greatly increase public transparency on potential profit shifting. While petroleum production is still some years away, priority should be given to building tax administration capacity in both the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and in the Large Taxpayer Office of the Kenyan Revenue Agency.
Uncovering these corporate structures is much more difficult than should be the case. Best practice in extractive sector good governance calls for the government to publish details of all companies holding oil, gas and mineral rights. Kenya already provides some of this information through the online mining cadastre portal. Comprehensive information on petroleum rights should also be published including the legal names of operators and their joint venture partners as well as their respective percentage stakes and the dates on which the relevant transaction were concluded. Furthermore, as Kenya has made a public commitment to joining the EITI, companies should be required to disclose full details of their corporate structures and their beneficial owners. 
